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GUARDIANSHIP: OVERCOMING THE LAST HURDLE
TO CIVIL RIGHTS FOR THE MENTALLY DISABLED
Sheryl Dicker *
Experience should teach us to be most on our guard to protect
liberty when the Government's purposes are beneficient....
The greatest dangers to liberty lurk in insidious encroachment by
men of zeal, well-meaning but without understanding.'
Guardianship is a legal mechanism for substitute decision-
making2 which comes in the guise of benevolence, as it was origi-
nally intended to protect the disabled individual and his property
from abuse, dissipation of resources, and the effects of designing
persons? It is an exercise of the state's role asparenspatriae for the
mentally and physically disabled.4 Yet, guardianship, in reality,
reduces the disabled person to the status of a child.5 Few incompe-
tent persons ever truly benefit from the guardianship system as prac-
* A.B., 1972; J.D. 1975, Syracuse University; Staff Attorney, Community Legal Serv-
ices, Inc. of Philadelphia 1975-1978; Project Attorney, American Bar Association Commis-
sion on the Mentally Disabled Mental Health Advocacy Project in Pennsylvania 1978-1979;
Director, Arkansas Developmental Disabilities Law Project. 1979-Present.
1. Olmstead v. United States, 277 U.S. 438, 479 (1928) (Brandeis, J., dissenting).
2. Kindred, Guardiansho and Limitations Upon Capacity, THE MENTALLY RETARDED
CITIZEN AND THE LAW 62 (1976) [hereinafter cited as Kindred].
3. Developmental Disabilities State Legislative Project, ABA Commission on the
Mentally Disabled, Guardianship and Conservatorshp 1-2 (1979) [hereinafter cited as ABA
Study).
4. Hawaii v. Standard Oil Co., 405 U.S. 251, 257 (1972); see Mormon Church v.
United States, 136 U.S. 1 (1890); Horstman, Protective Servicesfor the Elderly" The Limits of
Parens Patriae, 40 Mo. L. REV. 215 (1975) [hereinafter cited as Horstman]. See also Cohen,
Dosterhout, & Levitor, Tailoring Guardianshp to Meet the Needs of the Mentally Handi-
capped Citizen, 6 MD. L. FORUM 91 (1976).
5. Arkansas law treats minor and mentally incompetent persons similarly. See ARK.
STAT. ANN. § 57-601 (1976); Horstman, supra note 4, at 231. As an attorney representing
mentally disabled persons, I have often confronted the severe constraints on individual lib-
erty imposed by guardianship. Examples of guardianship cases which my clients have
presented:
A mentally disabled client whose father was guardian of his estate and forbade his son's
entry into the "contract of marriage."
A wealthy institutionalized mentally retarded client whose parents had designated a
prominent attorney to be his guardian. Despite his large estate, the guardian never provided
necessary funds so that the ward went year after year wearing old clothes and was unable to
participate in outside activities.
A young mentally retarded client who was signed into a mental institution as a "volun-
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ticed in Arkansas and most other states.6
Under the law of Arkansas and that of most states, guardian-
ship is an "all or nothing" proposition; either one is fully competent
or fully incompetent to handle his or her affairs requiring the ap-
pointment of a guardian to control and manage his or her property
and/or person.7 However, this "all or nothing" proposition does not
comport with reality; the abilities of mentally disabled persons to
manage their personal and financial affairs are diverse and amena-
ble to growth and development.' The vast majority of even the most
severely handicapped persons can manage their everyday affairs.9
Guardianship imposes life-long constraints which result in sub-
stantial and often unnecessary forfeiture of rights.' 0 Under Arkan-
sas law and the laws of most states, an incompetent's right to sell,
mortgage or lease his property is removed." He or she has no right
to enter into a contract, 12 to conduct business,' 3 to borrow money
and make gifts,' to choose his or her residence, 15 to agree to medi-
tary" patient by her guardian who thereafter actively prevented any efforts at community
placement.
A funeral director who was appointed guardian for hundreds of indigent mental pa-
tients in order to receive their Social Security death benefits.
6. G. ALEXANDER & T. LEWIN, THE AGED AND THE NEED FOR SURROGATE MAN-
AGEMENT 136 (1972) [hereinafter cited as ALEXANDER & LEWIN].
7. ARK. STAT. ANN. §§ 57-601 to -647 (1971). Thirty-three states have "all or nothing"
guardianship provisions. See ABA Study, supra note 3, at 4.
8. 89% of all mentally retarded persons are only mildly retarded and either blend into
society or with proper habilitation (the constellation of services such as education, medical
care, training necessary for mentally retarded to reach their full potential) can be independ-
ent and self-sufficient. Indeed, all mentally retarded persons are subject to growth and de-
velopment. "[E]veryone, no matter the degree or severity of retardation, is capable of
growth and development if given adequate and suitable treatment." Welsch v. Likins, 373
F. Supp. 487, 495 (D. Minn. 1974). See Halderman v. Pennhurst State School & Hosp., 446
F. Supp. 1295 (E.D. Pa. 1977), mod/ed, 612 F.2d 84 (3d Cir. 1979), rev'd, 101 S. Ct. 1531
(1981); S. HERR, THE NEW CLIENTS: LEGAL SERVICES FOR MENTALLY RETARDED PER-
SONS (1979); Roos, Mentally Retarded Citizens.- Challengefor the 1970's, 23 SYRACUSE L.
REV. 1059 (1972).
9. Hodgson, Guardianship of Mentally Retarded Persons. Three Approaches to a Long
Neglected Problem, 37 ALB. L. REV. 407, 408 (1973) [hereinafter cited as Hodgson].
10. ALEXANDER & LEWIN, supra note 6. Arkansas does have a temporary guardianship
procedure which permits emergency ex-parte guardianship orders for a maximum of 90 days
and authorizes the temporary guardian to perform specific tasks. Although this provision
could be viewed as a positive short-term solution, it has often been abused. ARK. STAT.
ANN. § 57-620 (1971). See, e.g., Von Luce v. Rankin, 267 Ark. 34, 588 S.W.2d 445 (1979);
Sparks v. First Nat'l Bank, 242 Ark. 435, 413 S.W.2d 865 (1967).
11. ARK. STAT. ANN. § 57-639 (1971); ABA Study, supra note 3, at 3-8.
12. Id § 57-628.
13. Id § 57-629.
14. Id § 57-630.
15. Id § 57-625. Many of the community based programs for the mentally retarded,
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cal "treatment" including sterilization,' 6 or to sign himself or herself
into an institution. 7 Therefore, a finding of incompetency and the
concomitant appointment of a guardian can affect every facet of an
individual's life.' 8 Indeed, the rights to habilitation and community
services discussed in the present symposium may prove meaningless
if persons have lost their freedom of choice and right to self-deter-
mination by invocation of the legal mechanism of incompetency
and guardianship.
I. THE CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHTS AT STAKE IN THE
GUARDIANSHIP PROCEEDING
When "the state undertakes to act in parens patriae, it has the
inescapable duty to vouchsafe due process."' 9 The fact that the state
is acting under its benevolent powers asparenspatriae does not ob-
viate the need for procedural due process when substantial interests
are involved.2 °
Throughout the nation, courts have recognized that civil com-
mitment of the mentally ill, although based in part on aparenspa-
triae rationale to protect the individual and his property, has a
devastating effect on individual liberty, and therefore, stringent pro-
cedural safeguards must be applied in those proceedings. 21 In Wes-
sel v. Pryor22 Judge Eisele declared the Arkansas civil commitment
statute unconstitutional as applied and established procedures for
the involuntary commitment of the mentally ill, including the right
to adequate prior notice of the proceeding, the right to effective
assistance of counsel, the right to be present at the hearing, the right
including those funded by H.U.D., require persons themselves to enter into lease agreements
which is impossible if one has been adjudicated incompetent. Conversation with Charles
Elliott, Deputy Commissioner DDS (Feb. 13, 1981).
16. ARK. STAT. ANN. § 59-5012 (1971) (Arkansas sterilization law). Guardians have
also consented to removal of organs for donation. Little v. Little, 576 S.W.2d 493 (Tex. Civ.
App. 1979). See also Robertson, Organ Donation by Incompetents and the Substitute Judg-
ment Doctrine, 76 COL. L. REV. 48, 53 (1976).
17. ARK. STAT. ANN. § 57-625 (1971).
18. ALEXANDER & LEWIN, supra note 6, at 136; Horstman, supra note 4.
19. Heryford v. Parker, 396 F.2d 393, 396 (10th Cir. 1968).
20. O'Connor v. Donaldson, 422 U.S. 563 (1975); McKeiver v. Pennsylvania, 403 U.S.
441 (1971); In re Gault, 387 U.S. 1 (1967).
21. O'Connor v. Donaldson, 422 U.S. 563 (1975); Wessel v. Pryor, 461 F. Supp. 1144
(E.D. Ark. 1978); Stamus v. Leonhardt, 414 F. Supp. 439 (S.D. Iowa 1976); Suzuki v.
Quisenberry, 411 F. Supp. 1113 (D. Hawaii 1976); Lynch v. Baxley, 386 F. Supp. 378 (M.D.
Ala. 1974); Lessard v. Schmidt, 349 F. Supp. 1078 (E.D. Wis. 1972), vacated and remanded on
other grounds, 414 U.S.473 (1974), on remand, 379 F. Supp. 1376 (E.D. Wis. 1974), vacated,
421 U.S. 957 (1975), on remand, 413 F. Supp. 1318 (E.D. Wis. 1976).
22. Wessel v. Pryor, 461 F. Supp. 1144 (E.D. Ark. 1978).
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to present evidence, and the right to confront and cross-examine ad-
verse witnesses.
The United States Supreme Court has held that persons have a
protected interest in not being erroneously labeled mentally ill.
23
The stigma of incompetence is comparable to that of mental illness
and may be even more egregious since it implies that one is mentally
defective, untrustworthy, and irresponsible. 24 Additionally, an ad-
judication of incompetency causes a multitude of legal disabilities. 25
The adjudication adversely affects an individual's reputation, right
to contract, right to enter into chosen occupations, and right to en-
gage in all of the other orderly pursuits of free persons held to in-
volve protected liberty interests.26 Albeit in another context, the
Court has stated that "procedural due process must be satisfied
when the state attaches a badge of infamy to a citizen. '27 Accord-
ingly, the "stigma" of mental incompetence falls within the ambit of
a protected liberty interest necessitating procedural due process.28
As a result of an adjudication of incompetency, one also forfeits
the right to manage money, enter into contracts, conduct business,
buy, sell or otherwise alienate property.29 Thus, several courts have
held that the appointment of guardians or committees to manage
the estate of an incompetent deprives one of substantial property
interests requiring procedural due process.3
23. Parham v. J.R., 442 U.S. 584 (1979); Addington v. Texas, 441 U.S. 418 (1979).
24. R. ALLEN, E. FERSTER, & H. WEIHOFEN, LEGAL IMPAIRMENT AND LEGAL INCOM-
PETENCY 37 (1967) [hereinafter cited as ALLEN, FERSTER, & WEIHOFEN].
25. In re Balley, 482 F.2d 648 (D.C. Cir. 1973).
26. Lynch v. Household Finance Corp., 405 U.S. 538, 545 (1972); Meyer v. Nebraska,
262 U.S. 390 (1923).
27. Wisconsin v. Constanteau, 400 U.S. 433, 437 (1971).
28. Vecchione v. Wohigemuth, 377 F. Supp. 1361, 1369 (E.D. Pa. 1974), aft'd, 558 F.2d
150 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 943 (1977); McAuliffe v. Carlson, 377 F. Supp. 896 (D.
Conn. 1974), rev'd on other grounds, 520 F.2d 1305 (2d Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 427 U.S. 911
(1976). Indeed, Justice Burger in his concurring opinion in O'Connor v. Donaldson, 422
U.S. 563 (1975), recognized that "an inevitable consequence of exercising the parens patriae
power is that the ward's personal freedom will be substantially restrained, whether a guard-
ian is appointed to control his property, he is placed in the custody of a private third party,
or committed to an institution. Thus, however, the power is implemented, due process re-
quires that it not be invoked indiscriminately." Id at 583.
29. ARK. STAT. ANN. § 57-625 to -630 (1971).
30. Dale v. Hahn, 440 F.2d 633 (2d Cir. 1971).
At stake in the petition to appoint plaintiffs committee was plaintiffs right to enter
into legal relations, to control and dispose of property, to enter into contracts, and
to sue and be sued-in short, at stake were all the incidents of being a competent
individual which are lost when one is declared to be incompetent.
Id at 636. See Vecchione v. Wohlgemuth, 377 F. Supp. 1361 (E.D. Pa. 1974), aff'd, 558
F.2d 150 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 943 (1977); McAuliffe v. Carlson, 377 F. Supp. 896
488 [Vol. 4:485
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As substantial property and liberty interests are at stake in the
guardianship proceeding, the full panoply of procedural due process
rights comparable to those present in civil commitment should be
applied.3
II. THE OPERATION OF THE ARKANSAS
GUARDIANSHIP STATUTE
The Arkansas Guardianship-Probate Code was passed in 1949
and contained, primarily, additions to prior law.32 Typical of most
state guardianship laws,33 that law defines an incompetent as any
(D. Conn. 1974), rev'd on other grounds, 520 F.2d 1305 (2d Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 427 U.S.
911 (1976).
31. See cases cited at supra note 21. Once the existence of a protectible property or
liberty interest has been established, the Supreme Court has balanced a number of factors to
determine what ingredients of procedural due process would apply.
First, the private interest that will be affected by the official action; second, the risk
of an erroneous deprivation of such interest through the procedure used, and the
probable value, if any, of additional or substitute procedural safeguards; and
finally, the Government's interest, including the function involved and the fiscal
and administrative burden that the additional or substitute procedural requirement
would entail.
Matthews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 335 (1976).
The application of this balancing test to guardianship makes the need for the full pano-
ply of procedural due process rights quite clear. (1) The private interests affected are the
paramount rights of the individual to liberty and property; to control every facet of his or
her life including his or her reputation, his or her financial and personal affairs. (2) The
risks of error are blatant under the laws of Arkansas and most states as fully discussed infra
II and include a) vague definition of incompetency which permit a myriad of interpretations
resulting in inconsistent and erroneous findings; b) lack of adequate notice which does not
alert the alleged incompetent to the seriousness of the proceeding and the need to marshal
his or her resources to insure a proper determination by the court; c) denial of the alleged
incompetent's right to be present at the proceeding which does not permit adequate chal-
lenge to the petition or permit the court the opportunity to observe the alleged incompetent
in order to make an adequate determination of competency; d) use of sworn testimony by a
physician does not permit the court to inquire into the physician's expertise in the particular
discipline at issue (i.e. mental illness or mental retardation), or the nature or lack of an
examination or permit cross-examination; the unreliability of diagnosis of mental incompe-
tence also raises a serious risk of error; e) no right to counsel permits little challenge to
purported evidence and little chance for additional evidence, including conflicting expert
testimony, to be introduced; f) lack of periodic review permits erroneous findings to last a
lifetime. (3) The costs to the state for full due process are minimal as they include more
time for court proceedings, and use of appointment of counsel (which can also be minimal if
free legal services are fully utilized).
32. See generally Dew v. Requa, 218 Ark. 911, 239 S.W.2d 603 (1951); Powers v. Chis-
man, 217 Ark. 508, 231 S.W.2d 598 (1950); Kelley v. Davis, 216 Ark. 828, 227 S.W.2d 637
(1959). As evidenced by the committee report, most changes in the Guardianship Statute of
1949 involved the duties and powers of guardians and not the adjudication of incompetency.
ARK. STAT. ANN. § 57-601 to -649 (1971).
33. ABA Study, supra note 3, at 3-69.
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person who is: "Incapable, by reason of insanity, mental illness, im-
becility, idiocy, senility, habitual drunkenness, excessive use of
drugs or other mental incapacity, either of managing his property or
caring for himself.' '3 4 While the law retains the language of earlier
Arkansas guardianship statutes, it continues to omit definitions of
the terms "imbecility," "idiocy," "managing his property," or "car-
ing for himself." Likewise, case law fails to illuminate the meaning
of these terms. 35 Thus, these terms are elastic and subject to a myr-
iad of interpretations. They are also subject to abuse through their
use as labels.36 These undefined and imprecise terms of the guardi-
anship law are subject to varying interpretations by lay persons as
well as psychiatrists. 37 This imprecision is particularly distressing
when coupled with studies which present serious doubt as to the
reliability and validity of psychiatric diagnoses.
38
A statute is "void for vagueness" when it fails to give warning
of prohibited conduct and lacks standards restricting the discretion
of the courts or governmental enforcers.39 Courts have found statu-
34. ARK. STAT. ANN. § 57-601 (1971). Keenan v. Peevy, 267 Ark. 218, 235, 590 S.W.2d
259, 269 (1979) [The Probate Court has no jurisdiction to appoint a guardian for a person
unable to care for herself because of physical incapacity only; "some form of mental inca-
pacity" must exist for the court to have jurisdiction under the Code].
35. The Committee Comment to ARK. STAT. ANN. § 57-601 (1971), reveals that the
definition of mentally incompetent persons "makes no substantial change in our present law
as found in Section 7543, Pope's Digest but does introduce and sanction the term 'mental
illness' which is more appropriate in many cases than the harsher terms, such as lunatic." In
Pulaski County v. Hill, 97 Ark. 450, 457, 134 S.W. 973, 975 (1911), the Arkansas Supreme
Court held that "the question in all such cases, where incapacity arising from defect of the
mind is alleged, is not whether the mind is itself diseased or the person is afflicted with any
particular form of insanity, but, rather, whether the powers of the mind have become so
affected, by whatever cause, as to render him incapable of transacting business. . . a person
must have capacity enough to comprehend and understand the nature and effect of the busi-
ness he is doing . . . to conduct ordinary affairs of life." This definition was adopted in
Parker v. Parker, 231 Ark. 635, 331 S.W.2d 694 (1960); Dew v. Requa, 218 Ark. 911, 239
S.W.2d 603 (1951).
36. See Comment, North Carolina Guardianshp Laws-The Needfor Change, 54 N.C.
L. REV. 389, 405-09 (1976).
37. ALLEN, FERSTER, & WIEHOFEN, supra note 24.
38. See, e.g., Addington v. Texas, 441 U.S. 418 (1979); O'Connor v. Donaldson, 422
U.S. 563 (1975); Ennis & Litwack, Psychiatry and the Presumption of Expertise.- Flpping
Coins in the Courtroom, 62 CAL. L. REV. 693 (1974) [hereinafter cited as Ennis & Litwack].
39. Papachristou v. Jacksonville, 405 U.S. 156 (1972); United States v. Robel, 389 U.S.
258 (1967); Boutilier v. Immigration and Naturalization Service, 387 U.S. 11 (1967). While
the doctrine principally has been used to declare criminal statutes unconstitutional, it has
also been applied to statutes involving important constitutional interests. For example, the
Arkansas Supreme Court in Davis v. Smith, 266 Ark. 112, 583 S.W.2d 37 (1979), declared a
statute unconstitutionally vague which provided for the appointment of a guardian to con-
sent to the adoption of minor children whose parents failed to provide "a proper home," an
undefined term in the statute. The Arkansas Supreme Court held that since the term
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tory terms in civil commitment laws which are analogous to those in
the Arkansas guardianship statute to be unconstitutionally vague.
40
In Goldy v. Beal4' a three-judge federal district court held that the
Pennsylvania statute permitting commitment of persons "in need of
care and treatment for mental disability" was unconstitutionally
vague since it was subject to many interpretations and failed to ad-
dress how incapacitated one must be to need care. Similarly, the
Arkansas statute gives no guidelines to the meaning of the terms
"'managing his property" or "caring for himself." The questions
and the possible interpretations of these vague terms are limitless.
Because of this vagueness, the sanctions of incompetency could
sweep much too broadly. Such vague and overbroad standards are
constitutionally impermissible and could arbitrarily deprive persons
of their constitutional rights.
42
Notice
Under Arkansas law the only notice required to be given to an
alleged incompetent is the notification of the date of the hearing
43
on the petition in probate court.44 This notification does not afford
the alleged incompetent person an explanation of the nature of the
proceeding, its consequences, or his or her rights as required when
protected liberty and property interests are at stake.45 This is partic-
ularly egregious since these proceedings involve persons who, by
reason of their disability, may be vulnerable, isolated, and without
knowledge of their legal rights.46
In commitment hearings, the Arkansas law requires that the
notice apprise persons of the nature of the proceedings and their
"proper home" is subject to a multiplicity of meanings, it does not provide sufficient guide-
lines to meet the due process requirement of the fourteenth amendment and the Arkansas
Constitution.
40. Goldy v. Beal, 429 F. Supp. 640 (M.D. Pa. 1976); Stamus v. Leonhardt, 414 F. Supp.
439 (S.D. Iowa 1976); Finken v. Roop, 339 A.2d 764 (Pa. 1975) cert. denied, 424 U.S. 960
(1976).
41. 429 F. Supp. 640 (M.D. Pa. 1973).
42. See, e.g., Goldy v. Beal, 429 F. Supp. 640 (M.D. Pa. 1976); In re Sealy, 218 So. 2d
765 (Fla. 1969).
43. The alleged incompetent must have at least three days notice. ARK. STAT. ANN.
§ 57-611 (1971). But the statute is exhaustive in its coverage of other persons who may be
entitled to notice. ARK. STAT. ANN. §§ 57-611 to -613 (1971).
44. ARK. STAT. ANN. § 57-604 (1971) provides that the Probate Court has exclusive
jurisdiction of guardianship proceedings.
45. Mullane v. Central Hanover Bank & Trust Co., 339 U.S. 306 (1950). See also
Covey v. Town of Somers, 351 U.S. 141 (1956).
46. See Dale v. Hahn, 486 F.2d 76 (2nd Cir. 1973), cert. denied, 419 U.S. 826 (1974).
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rights to counsel, to be present, to present witnesses, and to confront
and cross-examine adverse witnesses. 47 The same notice require-
ments should be utilized in guardianship proceedings as well.48
The Hearing
Under Arkansas law, the alleged incompetent does not have the
right to be present at the hearing, but may be required to be present
at the discretion of the court.49 In reality, few alleged incompetents
are present at guardianship proceedings in Arkansas or elsewhere, °
and hearings are truly exparte in nature with the petition treated as
uncontested." It is axiomatic that the right to an opportunity to be
heard includes the right to be present at the hearing and present
evidence to the extent of one's ability.
52
The sole evidence specifically required by statute for determi-
nation of incompetence is the admission of sworn testimony or sub-
mission of a sworn written statement from a physician. 3 In the
overwhelming majority of cases, the written statement of the doctor
which, at best, borrows the salient phrases of the statute,54 forms the
necessary evidence. Significantly, the case law provides that the
physician need not have examined the alleged incompetent, but
merely must have filed a statement attesting to his or her
47. Wessel v. Pryor, 461 F. Supp. 1144 (E.D. Ark. 1978); ARK. STAT. ANN. § 59-1401
(Cum. Supp. 1981).
48. Schneider v. Radack, Yanton County Cir. Ct., 1st Jud. Cir. (July 30, 1974). See
generally Horstman, supra note 4, at 235.
49. ARK. STAT. ANN. § 57-615 (Cum. Supp. 1981). Indeed, guardianship orders for
those incarcerated in out-of-state institutions have been upheld. Sanders v. Omohundro,
204 Ark. 1040, 166 S.W.2d 657 (1942). Guardianship orders are not void on their face if the
judge abused his discretion by not requiring the presence of the alleged incompetent. Hyde
v. McNeely, 193 Ark. 1139, 104 S.W.2d 1068 (1937).
50. Horstman, supra note 4, at 235; Levy, Protecting the Mentally Retarded" An Empiri-
cal Survey and Evaluation of the Establishment of State Guardianship in Minnesota, 49 MINN.
L. REV. 821, 881-86 (1965) [hereinafter cited as Levy].
51. Horstman, supra note 4, a 241; interview with the Honorable Tom Glaze of the
Arkansas Court of Appeals, a former Chancellor and Probate Court Judge (April 13, 1981).
52. Boddie v. Connecticut, 401 U.S. 731 (1971); Armstrong v. Manzo, 380 U.S. 545, 552
(1965).
53. ARK. STAT. ANN. § 57-615 (Cum. Supp. 1981).
54. An exhaustive survey of Arkansas case law reveals no cases relying on oral testi-
mony of physicians for initial incompetency determinations. Apparently, physicians have
been required to testify only on collateral issues, such as enforcement of contracts by incom-
petents, Alley v. Rodgers, 269 Ark. 262, 599 S.W.2d 739 (1980), or efforts to quash original
orders, Parker v. Parker, 231 Ark. 635, 331 S.W.2d 694 (1960); Powers v. Chisman, 217 Ark.
508, 231 S.W.2d 598 (1950). See also Wilson v. Williams, 215 Ark. 576, 221 S.W.2d 773
(1949); Sanders v. Omohundro, 204 Ark. 1040, 166 S.W.2d 657 (1942) (involving a letter
from a physician written in 1912). Judge Glaze's experience confirms this, supra note 52.
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incompetence. 5
In Alley v. Rodgers,56 decided recently by the Arkansas
Supreme Court, the court, in passing, referred to the one-sentence
physician's statement upon which the initial guardianship order was
based. This statement said only that the physician did not feel the
alleged incompetent was capable of handling his personal affairs.57
More often, the sole question at issue is whether the alleged incom-
petent has a specific disability.5 8 Therefore, the type of conduct ex-
hibited warranting the protection of guardianship seldom becomes
the crucial factor in determining incompetence.5 9 The appointment
of guardians for institutionalized persons in Arkansas has been ren-
dered routine by cursory factual determinations or virtual
noninvolvement by the physicians required by the statute. °
The use of brief and conclusive statements as the basis for a
deprivation of liberty and property renders the right to confront and
cross-examine the physician crucial. Nevertheless, the statute is si-
lent on this right and, by sanctioning the affidavit procedure, insures
that few physicians will testify in court and be available for cross-
examination.' Physicians may not have the necessary training or
experience to diagnose the enumerated disabilities.62 Mental retar-
dation, for example, is determined by tests not generally adminis-
tered by physicians nor in their area of expertise.6 3  Even
psychiatrists who have special training in the treatment of mental
55. Sparks v. First Nat'l Bank, 242 Ark. 435, 413 S.W.2d 865 (1967).
56. 269 Ark. 262, 599 S.W.2d 739 (1980).
57. Id at 265, 599 S.W.2d at 741.
58. Mitchell, The Objects of Our Wisdom and Our Coercion.- Involuntary Guardianship
for Incompetents, 52 S. CAL. L. REV. 1405, 1420 (1979) [hereinafter cited as Mitchell]. IQ is
often the sole basis for incompetency. In a Minnesota study, physicians testifying in guardi-
anship hearings routinely believed that IQ's were sufficient evidence of mental incompe-
tency without any other proven limitations. Levy, supra note 50, at 884.
59. ALEXANDER & LEWIN, supra note 6, at 24.
60. The Arkansas Division of Developmental Disabilities Services (DDS) encourages
families to seek appointment of guardians for all residents at the institutions for mentally
retarded. Institutional staff routinely send a letter to the family advising them to petition for
guardianship of the resident because it is mandated, allegedly, by law or federal regulation.
Attached to the letter is a form affidavit signed by a staff physician which contains only two
lines regarding the alleged incompetent's condition:
It is my professional opinion, based upon my personal observation and treatment
of , that he is in fact mentally retarded. His average I.Q. is -,
and it is necessary that a guardian of the person and estate be appointed to take
care of his affairs as he is totally unable to do so for himself
Letters from all the institutions are on file with the author.
61. ARK. STAT. ANN. § 57-615 (Cum. Supp. 1981).
62. See generally Levy, supra note 50, at 884.
63. Id
1981]
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diseases are notoriously poor in predicting behavior; the reliability
and validity of their statements that the person is "unable to manage
his property or care for himself' are, therefore, questionable.64
While the statute allows the court to appoint a guardian ad li-
tern, it is silent on the right to counsel.65 In order, however, to as-
sure that the alleged incompetent is afforded a meaningful hearing,
due process guarantees the right to "the guiding hand of counsel,"
66
and, if the alleged incompetent is indigent, to the appointment of
counsel or information about the availability of free legal services.6 7
In the vast majority of proceedings, an attorney for the alleged in-
competent seldom appears, and only the attorney for the petitioner
and the judge are present at the hearing. 68 Accordingly, in states
where studies have been conducted under similar statutes, the court
proceedings have averaged only three minutes.69
The statute does not address the standard of proof which is to
be employed in the hearing, and, since a contested hearing is rarely
held, there has been no need for articulation of the standard.7" In
the rare instance of a contested proceeding, the practice is to apply
the preponderance of the evidence standard7" which inevitably re-
64. Addington v. Texas, 441 U.S. 418 (1979); O'Connor v. Donaldson, 422 U.S. 563
(1975); Ennis & Litwack, supra note 38.
65. ARK. STAT. ANN. § 57-601 (1971 & Cum. Supp. 1981). Representation by a guard-
ian ad litem charged to act in one's best interest and not necessarily to act on one's behalf is
inadequate to satisfy the constitutionally mandated right to counsel. Lessard v. Schmidt,
349 F. Supp. 1078 (E.D. Wis. 1972), vacated and remanded on other grounds, 414 U.S. 473
(1974), on remand, 379 F. Supp. 1376 (E.D. Wis. 1974), vacated, 421 U.S. 957 (1975), on
remand, 413 F. Supp. 1318 (E.D. Wis. 1976); Quesnell v. State, 83 Wash. 2d 224, 517 P.2d
568 (1973); State v. Mundy, 75 Wis. 2d 276, 249 N.W.2d 573 (1977); Mitchell, su ra note 58,
at 1419.
66. Heryford v. Parker, 396 F.2d 393 (10th Cir. 1968); Wessel v. Pryor, 461 F. Supp.
1144 (E.D. Ark. 1978).
67. Stamus v. Leonhardt, 414 F. Supp. 439 (S.D. Iowa 1976); Lynch v. Baxley, 386 F.
Supp. 378 (M.D. Ala. 1974).
68. See, e.g., Lingo v. Rainwater, 199 Ark. 618, 136 S.W.2d 161 (1940), in which the
Arkansas Supreme Court affirmed a decision appointing a guardian which was made by a
probate court judge while on vacation but later confirmed. The National Senior Citizens
Law Center in its 1973-74 study of guardianship proceedings in California found that in
84.2% of cases only the Judge, Petitioner, and Attorney for Petitioner were present and in
only 1% of cases was an attorney present to represent the alleged incompetent. Horstman,
supra note 4, at 231. See ALEXANDER & LEWIN, supra note 6, at 1-5; Levy, supra note 50, at
881-84.
69. Levy, supra note 50, at 881-86; ALEXANDER & LEWIN, supra note 6, at 1-5; Horst-
man, supra note 4, at 235.
70. Interview with the Honorable Tom Glaze, supra note 5 1.
71. See Letter to Arkansas Legislative Council from the Honorable Thomas F. Butt,
Chancellor (Sept. 3, 1980) (on file with the author).
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suits in "erring on the side of caution" by finding incompetence.72
In Addington v. Texas73 the United States Supreme Court held
that in view of potential serious deprivation of liberty, the adverse
social consequences, and serious risk of error, the standard of proof
in civil commitment cases must be by clear and convincing
evidence.
At one time or another every person exhibits some abnormal be-
havior which might be perceived by some as symptomatic of a
mental or emotional disorder, but which is in fact within a range
of conduct that is generally acceptable. Obviously, such behavior
is no basis for compelled treatment and surely none for confine-
ment. However, there is a possible risk that a factfinder might
decide to commit an individual based solely on a few isolated
instances of unusual conduct. Loss of liberty calls for showing
that the individual suffers from something more serious than is
demonstrated by idiosyncratic behavior. Increasing the burden
of proof is one way to impress the factfinder with the importance
of the decision. .. .
Indeed, the Supreme Court in Addington, by implication, may have
decided the standard of proof to be employed in incompetency pro-
ceedings as well. Addington involved a Texas commitment law
75
which permitted indefinite involuntary hospitalization for persons
found to be mentally ill, in need of hospitalization to protect them-
selves or others, and mentally incompetent. Thus, in Texas, in order
to be involuntarily committed, one must first be found to be men-
tally incompetent. Since the standard of proof to be applied in this
proceeding is clear and convincing evidence, the inquiry into mental
incompetence should so conform.76
Finally, since the adjudication of incompetency and appoint-
ment of a guardian infringes on a multitude of personal rights, due
process requires some periodic review to determine the continued
need for a guardianship.77
72. Parker v. Parker, 231 Ark. 635, 331 S.W.2d 694 (1960); Metcalfe v. Nichol, 225 Ark.
574, 283 S.W.2d 853 (1955); Lester v. Pilkinton, 225 Ark. 349, 282 S.W.2d 590 (1955); Powers
v. Chisman, 217 Ark. 508, 231 S.W.2d 598 (1950); Levy, supra note 50, at 880.
73. 441 U.S. 418 (1979).
74. Id. at 426-27.
75. TEX. REV. CIV. STAT. ANN. art. 5547-57 (Vernon Cum. Supp. 1980-1981).
76. See also Heap v. Roulet, 152 Cal. Rptr. 425, 590 P.2d 1 (1979), in which the Califor-
nia Supreme Court held that the appointment of a conservator (who has many powers, in-
cluding the power to commit) must be beyond a reasonable doubt.
77. Jackson v. Indiana, 406 U.S. 715, 734 (1972); Developments in the Law-Civil Com-
mitment ofthe Mentally 111, 87 HARV. L. REV. 1190, 1391 (1974). This is particularly signifi-




The court may find either that the person is fully competent or
that the person is fully incompetent and requires a guardian.
78 If
the probate court finds a person to be incompetent, a guardian of the
estate and/or the person is appointed.7 9 Upon appointment, the
guardian is required to issue letters of guardianship to the public,
advising that he or she has been appointed the guardian for the in-
competent person.80 The guardian of the estate must make an an-
nual accounting to the court; however, the guardian of the person is
required to make a report on the condition of the ward only at the
direction of the court.8'
Orders finding a person to be partially incompetent or authoriz-
ing the guardian to manage only specific areas are not permitted
under Arkansas law nor the law of thirty-three other states.82 This
contravenes the Supreme Court directive that the state must achieve
its legitimate goals by methods that least intrude on fundamental
rights.83
[E]ven though the governmental purpose be legitimate and sub-
stantial, that purpose cannot be pursued by means that broadly
stifle fundamental personal liberties when the end can be more
narrowly achieved. The breadth of legislative abridgment must
be viewed in the light of less drastic means for achieving the same
basic purpose.84
Law and Mentally Retarded People.- An Uncertain Future, 31 STAN. L. REV. 613 (1979)
[hereinafter cited as Roos].
78. ARK. STAT. ANN. § 57-615 (1971).
79. It is the duty of the guardian of the person "to care for and maintain the ward."
ARK. STAT. ANN. § 57-624(a) (1971). It is the duty of the guardian of the estate "to exercise
due care to protect and preserve it, to invest it and apply it as provided in this code, to
account for it faithfully." ARK. STAT. ANN. § 57-624(b) (1971). Of the approximately 2,000
guardianship petitions filed last year in Arkansas, Report of the Justice Department, 1980,
there are no statistics on the number of appointments of guardians of estate and/or person.
A survey of the case law reveals that most procedures result in the appointment of both the
guardian of the person and the estate, however, a corporation cannot be a guardian of the
person. Bogan v. Arkansas First Nat'l Bank, 249 Ark. 840, 462 S.W.2d 203 (1971).
80. ARK. STAT. ANN. § 57-618 to -619 (1971). This process of issuing letters further
substantiates the presence of a stigma of incompetence.
81. ARK. STAT. ANN. §§ 57-624(a), -642 (1971).
82. ABA Study, supra note 3, at 4. The abilities of an individual disabled person may,
for example, enable the person to manage money under $500.00 but not larger amounts, pay
his or her rent but not be able to fulfill duties of property ownership, or make everyday
decisions but be unable to give informed consent to medical treatment. See Kindred, supra
note 2; Roos, supra note 77.
83. Dunn v. Blumstein, 405 U.S. 330 (1972); Dean Milk Co. v. City of Madison, 340
U.S. 349 (1951).
84. Shelton v. Tucker, 364 U.S. 479, 488 (1960).
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This concept of least restrictive alternative has been applied to
civil commitments, thereby requiring an exploration of the least re-
strictive environment for the provision of treatment prior to the im-
position of involuntary commitment to an institution. 5 Similarly,
because the finding of incompetency affects fundamental constitu-
tional rights, the right to an exploration of least restrictive alterna-
tives to provide necessary protection to the incompetent should
attach.86 The application of the concept to guardianship proceed-
ings requires an exploration of the specific interests to be protected
and the specific needs and deficiencies of the alleged incompetent so
that the methods utilized can achieve the desired protection with the
least infringement on fundamental rights.87
If it is shown, however, that the desired protection cannot be
achieved short of appointment of a guardian, the court should con-
tinue to apply this concept by authorizing limited guardianships
with the guardian having the power to perform only specific, defin-
able tasks.8 The Arkansas guardianship statute does not provide
for such less restrictive orders. Therefore, the statute subjects per-
sons to needless infringements of their rights in violation of due
process. 89
III. THE FAILURE OF PIECEMEAL LITIGATION
Despite these serious constitutional infirmities there has been a
dearth of challenges to guardianship statutes.90 Many challenges
85. ARK. STAT. ANN. §§ 59-1401 to -1428 (Cum. Supp. 1981); Suzuki v. Quisenberry,
411 F. Supp. 1113 (D. Hawaii 1976); Lynch v. Baxley, 386 F. Supp. 378 (M.D. Ala. 1974),
vacated, 414 U.S. 473 (1974); Welsch v. Likins, 373 F. Supp. 487 (D. Minn. 1974),partialy
vacated on other grounds, 550 F.2d 1122 (8th Cir. 1977); Lessard v. Schmidt, 349 F. Supp.
1078 (E.D. Wis. 1972), vacated and remanded on other grounds, 414 U.S. 473 (1974), on re-
mand, 379 F. Supp. 1376 (E.D. Wis. 1974), vacated, 421 U.S. 957 (1975), on remand, 413 F.
Supp. 1318 (E.D. Wis. 1976); Chambers, Alternative to Civil Commitment of the Mentally Ill:
Practical Guide and Constitutional Imperatives, 70 MICH. L. REV. 1107 (1972).
86. Vecchione v. Wohlgemuth, 80 F.R.D. 32 (E.D. Pa. 1978); In re Guardianship of
Shaw, 87 Wis. 2d 503, 275 N.W.2d 143 (1979); Lippman, The Right to Least Restrictive Alter-
natives in Guardianship, MENTALLY RETARDED CITIZENS AND THE LAW 520 (1976) [herein-
after cited as Lippman].
87. Id
88. Lippman, supra note 86, at 520; President's Panel on Mental Retardation, Report of
Task Force on Law 213 (1963); 1 MENTAL DISABILITY LAW REPORTER 454 (1978).
89. Smith v. Goguen, 415 U.S. 566 (1974); Stamus v Leonhardt, 414 F. Supp. 439 (S.D.
Iowa 1976).
90. Rud v. Dahli, 578 F.2d 674 (7th Cir. 1978); Dale v. Hahn, 440 F.2d 633 (2d Cir.
1971); Schultz v. Borradaile, Civ. App. No. 74-40123 (E.D. Mich. June 8, 1979); Tod v.
Smith, Civ. App. No. 75-10024 (E.D. Mich. June 8, 1979); Snyder v. Altman, 444 F. Supp.
1269 (C.D. Cal. 1977); Vecchione v. Wohlgemuth, 377 F. Supp. 1361 (E.D. Pa. 1974), aft'd,
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have been dismissed on procedural grounds.9' There have been two
challenges to the Arkansas statute, both of which resulted in with-
drawal of the original petitions, rendering the challenges moot.
92
Only one statute, the South Dakota law, has been declared un-
constitutional. 93 There, the court was presented with a challenge to
the civil commitment process and analyzed the guardianship proce-
dure which permitted voluntary commitment by a guardian. The
court held that the ward is entitled to adequate notice and an oppor-
tunity to be heard, including the right to appointment of counsel,
the right to periodic review, and the application of standards of in-
competency that are not vague.94 The few other successful cases
have cured only specific defects of a particular law or practice.95
In Dale v. Hahn96 a former mental patient filed an exhaustive
due process challenge to the New York incompetency statute.
While Ms. Dale was a mental patient, the state filed a petition alleg-
ing her incompetence and requesting the appointment of a commit-
tee to manage her funds. The petition was granted and a committee
558 F.2d 150 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 943 (1977); McAuliffe v. Carlson, 377 F. Supp.
896 (D. Conn. 1974), rev'd on other grounds, 520 F.2d 1305 (2d Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 427
U.S. 911 (1976).
91. Rud v. Dahl, 578 F.2d 674 (7th Cir. 1978); Schultz v. Borradaile, Civ. App. No. 74-
40123 (E.D. Mich. June 8, 1979); Tod v. Smith, Civ. App. No. 75-10024 (E.D. Mich. June 8,
1979); Snyder v. Altman, 444 F. Supp. 1269 (C.D. Cal. 1977). In all four cases, the court
invoked the doctrine of abstention.
92. Griffin Stockley of Central Arkansas Legal Services and the author have been coun-
sel in both abated challenges. In In re Alphonso McLeash, No. 6634, Pulaski County Pro-
bate Court, the son of an elderly resident of a VA hospital sought to be appointed the
guardian of his father's person and estate. After oral argument and submission of briefs on
the constitutional issues, the petitioner withdrew his petition. In In re Lee Ann Ueckert, No.
81-1, Miller County Probate Court, the father of a 17 year old mildly mentally retarded girl
sought appointment as guardian of his daughter's person and estate on the grounds of
mental incompetence, essentially as an effort to continue control over her life after she
reached majority. After the submission of the respondent's Motion for Declaratory Judg-
ment seeking a declaration of the statute's unconstitutionality and application of constitu-
tional procedures in the instant case, the court refused to address the mental incompetence
issue choosing, instead, to appoint a guardian for the remaining period of minority only.
(Interestingly, some states have laws dealing with precisely this question and permit continu-
ation of parental authority over the mentally retarded. Eg., N.Y. SURR. CT. PRoc. ACT
§§ 1750-1755 (McKinney Supp. 1981).
93. See Schneider v. Radack, Yankton County Cir. Ct., 1st Jud. Cir. (S.D. July 30,
1974).
94. Id
95. Dale v. Hahn, 440 F.2d 633 (2d Cir. 1971); Vecchione v. Wohlgemuth, 377 F. Supp.
1361 (E.D. Pa. 1974), af'd, 558 F.2d 150 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 943 (1977); McAu-
liffe v. Carlson, 377 F. Supp. 896 (D. Conn. 1974), rev'don other grounds, 520 F.2d 1305 (2d
Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 427 U.S. 911 (1976).
96. 440 F.2d 633 (2d Cir. 1971).
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was appointed. The committee spent $5,686.00 of the total assets of
$8,000.00 for mental hospital bills and committee expenses during
her hospitalization. The court, however, avoided the issue of the
statute's constitutionality and, instead, held only that Ms. Dale had
been denied adequate notice of the incompetency proceeding. 97 In
the aftermath of that decision, the New York incompetency statute
has remained intact and only the notice provisions have been
altered. 98
Several cases have attacked the automatic practice, as illus-
trated by Dale v. Hahn, of stripping mental patients of the use and
control of their property in order to gain payment of hospital bills.99
In Vecchione v. Wohlgemuth o a class of institutionalized persons
challenged the Pennsylvania statute °10 which authorized the revenue
agent of each institution to appropriate, without court intervention,
the assets of mental patients with total assets under $2,500.00. The
seized assets were to be used to pay hospital bills. In contrast, per-
sons with assets over $2,500.00 could not lose the use and control of
their funds except through institution of the Pennsylvania incompe-
tency proceeding.10 2 The district court found the procedure to be
97. Id at 638. The case was originally dismissed in the lower court for failure to state a
claim upon which relief could be granted. The Second Circuit reversed and remanded that
decision, holding that a cause of action had, indeed, been stated and further holding that
there may have been deprivations of liberty or property interests. Id. at 633. Subsequently,
the Second Circuit held that the plaintiff did not receive constitutionally adequate notice of
the proceeding. Dale v. Hahn, 486 F.2d 76 (2d Cir. 1973), cert. denied, 419 U.S. 826 (1974).
98. The New York incompetency statute was amended in 1978 to provide that service of
process must be made upon the official in charge of the institution as well as the Mental
Health Information Service, the legal representative for New York mental patients. N.Y.
MENTAL HYG. LAW § 78.03 (McKinney 1978).
99. Vecchione v. Wohlgemuth, 377 F. Supp. 1361 (E.D. Pa. 1974), affid, 558 F.2d 150
(3d Cir.), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 943 (1977); McAuliffe v. Carlson, 377 F. Supp. 896 (D. Conn.
1974), rev'don other grounds, 520 F.2d 1305 (2d Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 427 U.S. 911 (1976).
Arkansas has a similar procedure authorizing payment to an institution for an incompetent
with assets under $100 without the formal appointment of a guardian. ARK. STAT. ANN.
§ 57-646.1 (1971). It is estimated that over 100 petitions to dispense with guardianship were
filed under that provision for residents of the Arkansas Children's Colony system. The peti-
tions and court orders refer to the subject of the proceeding at all times as an incompetent
although no separate proceeding to declare the person incompetent was held. Conversations
with Robert Fortner, M.A. and David Maxwell, M.S.W. of Human Development Center at
Booneville (June 4, 1981). It may be that a situation similar to Vecchione has occurred in
Arkansas warranting scrutiny.
100. 377 F. Supp. 1361 (E.D. Pa. 1974), af§'d, 558 F.2d 150 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 434
U.S. 943 (1977).
101. 50 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. §§ 3201-3202 (Purdon 1969) (current version at 20 PA.
CONS. STAT. ANN. § 5505 (Purdon 1975)).
102. 50 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 3301 (Purdon 1969) (current version at 20 PA. CONS.
STAT. ANN. § 5511 (Purdon 1975)).
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unconstitutional under the equal protection10 3 and due process' °4
clauses of the fourteenth amendment. The court ordered the institu-
tion of incompetency proceedings and court appointment of a
guardian prior to the seizure and use of all institutionalized persons'
funds. 105
Pursuant to the 1974 court order in Vecchione, a consent decree
was adopted by the parties but later repudiated by the state defen-
dants. This consent decree permitted over $9,000,000.00 wrongfully
withheld to be repaid to the patients.'0 6 After protracted litigation
concerning the enforcement of the consent decree, a new consent
decree was agreed upon by the parties in 1978.107
The new decree set up a new procedure authorizing the ap-
pointment of "guardian officers" at each institution for mentally ill
and mentally retarded persons. 08 Additionally, the consent decree
required that the competency of all present patients and future pa-
tients must be assessed within thirty days of admission. 0 9 If the
institutional director issued an opinion assessing the patient to be
incompetent, the guardian officer would refer the matter to the State
Department of Justice for the commencement of incompetency pro-
ceedings, and if no alternative guardians could be found, the guard-
ian officer could be appointed guardian to manage the funds of the
incompetent patient." 0 The guardian officer might also be ap-
pointed the representative payee for SSI or Social Security benefits
if no acceptable non-institutional person or agency existed. For So-
cial Security benefits this representative payee status could not ex-
ceed six months. ' Social Services staff at each institution were also
charged with advising and assisting patients in safeguarding and
103. The court held that the statute created two classes of mental patients similarly situ-
ated, one afforded prior notice and hearing before they lost control and use of their property,
and the other denied that right.
104. The court held that the right to prior notice and hearing was essentially a due pro-
cess right guaranteed by the 14th Amendment to the Constitution. 43 FORD. L. REV. 624
(1975).
105. 377 F. Supp. at 1372.
106. Approximately $250,000.00 of that money has remained unclaimed and the court is
considering whether it has the power under the doctrine of cypres to order its expenditure.
Letter from Terry Roth, Esq. of the Pennsylvania Legal Services Center to the author (May
12, 1981) (on file with the author) (hereinafter cited as Roth letter).
107. 80 F.R.D. 32 (E.D. Pa. 1978).
108. Id at 62. Most often the guardian officers were the former revenue agents who
enforced the prior statute.
109. Id at 59.
110. Id
111. Id at 58.
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managing their property. This included patient money management
training to the end that a guardian would not be required in the
future. ' 2 Finally, the procedure stated that the guardian officer
should act independently of the institution and in conformity with
the patient's best interest, while being permitted to raise issues chal-
lenging hospital bills and seeking abatement of those bills."1
3
In essence, the Vecchione consent decree designed procedures
to be instituted before and after an incompetency proceeding. The
statute governing the declaration of incompetence was left intact.
Because of that glaring problem, several organizations filed objec-
tions to the Vecchione consent decree warning that it would result in
a declaration of incompetence for thousands of mental patients and
institutionalized mentally retarded persons.' " The court, however,
rejected these objections and held that the settlement was fair."1
5
The objectors' fears were well grounded. Like the Arkansas
statute, the Pennsylvania statute contains vague and overbroad lan-
112. Id at 67-68.
113. Id at 62-65.
114. The Pennsylvania Association for Retarded Citizens (PARC), the Berks County
Mental Health Association, and the American Bar Association Mental Health Legal Advo-
cacy Project all filed objections to the settlement. (Indeed, PARC filed a motion to alter or
amend the class certification issued in 1977 which included mental patients and mentally
retarded persons within the same class. PARC objected to mentally retarded persons being
treated in the same class because none of the named plaintiffs were mentally retarded and no
evidence on mental retardation had been presented to the court.) The objections of all three
parties, however, focused on the failure of the consent decree to permit less restrictive meth-
ods to govern money management matters for institutionalized persons. PARC suggested,
for example, that the common-law theory of agency be applied and that agents be recruited
and paid a small stipend. These agents would assist the institutionalized person in the man-
agement of money but would allow the person to retain the power of a principal under
agency law, thereby allowing them the ultimate decision on how their money should be
spent. They also alleged that the guardianship proceedings may be abused and that a
greater chance of mistake is present for the retarded. They further objected to the use of the
guardian officers as institutional employees and warned that such guardian officers would
not be independent or immune from institutional pressures. Additionally, PARC contended
that the mechanical skills of money management are improperly treated as indices of com-
petence and noted that without such skills, most mentally retarded people are likely to be
adjudicated incompetent. The ABA alleged that a guardian ad litem should be provided at
competency hearings and a bond should be required of guardian officers. Also, the Mental
Health Association objected to the following: that no provision was present for patient pref-
erence in the choice of a representative payee; that there was no provision for patients to
deal with abuse by institutional staff in making determinations or by the guardian officer in
handling funds; that there was no indication that patients would receive clear notice that
they might challenge the billing of the revenue agent; and that the guardian office should be
open for deposit and withdrawal of funds of residents. Id at 41-50; Briefs of PARC, ABA
and Berk County Mental Health Association (on file with the author).
115. 80 F.R.D. at 57.
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guage," 16 does not require adequate notice of the nature and effect of
the incompetency hearing, permits the court to waive the right of the
alleged incompetent to be present upon "positive testimony" that
due to his physical or mental condition his welfare would not be
promoted by his presence, and does not grant a right to counsel or
the right to confront and cross-examine adverse witnesses. 17
The result of Vecchione has been the reassessment or examina-
tion of every institutionalized mentally ill and mentally retarded
person. Each institution has designed its own assessment tools or
methodology designed to label persons as competent or incompe-
tent. 18 Efforts to find alternative representative payees have varied
from institution to institution." 9 In the years since the Vecchione
consent decree, over 5,000 "Vecchione" incompetency petitions
have been filed. Approximately 500 of these petitions were with-
drawn because the patient died, was discharged, or a representative
payee was found to handle his or her Social Security checks. Of the
4,500 petitions that were presented to the court, virtually all have
resulted in the appointment of the guardian officer as the guard-
ian. 120 Of the petitions filed pursuant to the Pennsylvania statute,
the vast majority of proceedings have been conducted without the
alleged incompetent's presence, without adequate notice, without
knowledgeable counsel,' 2' without the right to confront and cross-
116. 20 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 5501 (Purdon 1975) defines "incompetent" as "a person
who, because of infirmities of old age, mental illness, mental deficiency or retardation, drug
addiction or inebriety: (1) is unable to manage his property, or is liable to dissipate it or
become the victim of designing persons; or (2) lacks sufficient capacity to make or commu-
nicate responsible decisions concerning his person." See also Comment, An Assessment of
the Pennsylvania Estate Guardianship Incompetency Standard, 121 U. PA. L. REV. 1048
(1976).
117. 20 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 5511 (Purdon 1975).
118. According to American Bar Association Mental Health Legal Advocacy Project
data, some institutions had written evaluation tools and others did not. For example, at
Wernersville State Hospital a written evaluation tool was utilized by staff psychiatrists to
assess incompetency while at Haverford State Hospital there was no formal method of as-
sessing incompetency and, instead, assessment was based solely on the judgment of the ex-
amining psychiatrist.
119. There has been no guidance given to guardian officers on the sort of effort that must
be made to locate representative payees and, thus, their efficiency has varied from institution
to institution. However, in the limited places where advocates have been active, representa-
tive payees have often been found. Interview with Judy Greenwood, Community Legal
Services of Philadelphia, attorney for plaintiffs in Vecchione (February 26, 1981).
120. See Roth letter, supra note 106.
121. In "In re Appointment of Special Masters," No. I Alleged Incompetent Special
Docket, Pa. Sup. Ct. (Oct. 1, 1979), the Pennsylvania Supreme Court mandated appointment
of counsel in all Vecchione incompetency proceedings. But, unfortunately, because of seri-
ous constitutional defects in the statute and the unfamiliarity of appointed counsel with the
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examine witnesses, 122 without the right to periodic review, and or-
ders have not been permitted that are least restrictive of the ward's
rights. The hearings have averaged three minutes and almost al-
ways result in a finding of incompetency.123 Few appeals of these
hearings have been filed. 124 Additionally, efforts to utilize proce-
dures for abatement of hospital bills have also remained largely un-
successful. 125 Upon the patient's discharge, the guardian officer has
often remained the guardian.
26
Thus, the cure in Vecchione may have been worse than the dis-
ease. If the procedures under Vecchione were allowed to work fully
so that money management training occurred, representative payees
were appointed, and abatement procedures were permitted, the sys-
tem would still result in a serious loss of rights because of the nature
of the guardianship statute.' 27 Before Vecchione, persons could lose
statute or the nature of incompetency, the presence of counsel has not made a substantial
difference. See also Comment, Mandatory Appointment of Counsel in Pennsylvania Guardian-
ship Proceedings, 84 DICK. L. REV. 97 (1979).
122. Mandating the presence of the examining physician and counsel at the hearings has
resulted in a decreased number of petitions filed. See, e.g., ABA data on Haverford State
Hospital on file with the author.
123. The appeals filed to date on post-Veechione competency proceedings have demon-
strated the brevity of proceedings and their failure to permit less restrictive orders. For
example, in In re Nogay, #428 to 433 (1978 Term), sixty persons were declared incompetent
in only two days of proceedings. None of the persons were present in any of these hearings.
In In re Appointment of Guardians for Buska #87-96 (March Term 1978) before the
Supreme Court of Pennsylvania, ten persons were declared incompetent. This case further
documents that of the first 187 post- Vecchione hearings, all persons were declared
incompetent.
124. Pursuant to an appeal challenging the constitutionality of the Pennsylvania statute,
the Pennsylvania Supreme Court has mandated the appointment of counsel in all Vecchione
incompetency proceedings, supra note 121. As a result, knowledgeable and aggressive coun-
sel have at times been present at these hearings, have subjected examining physicians to
vigorous cross-examination, and have introduced expert testimony to counter the testimony
of the State's expert. Yet, because of the slippery and opaque definition of incompetence
and the prohibition of flexible guardianship orders, most of these cases have resulted in
appointment of guardians. The only appeals filed to date are listed at supra note 123. Series
of correspondence with Robert Manara, Esq., counsel in In Re Appointment of Guardians
for Buska and many other Vecchione guardianship proceedings, on file with the author.
125. Tartandra v. Commonwealth, 52 Pa. Commw. Ct. 579, 416 A.2d 608 (1980); Ed-
wards v. Commonwealth, 34 Pa. Commw. Ct. 622, 384 A.2d 293 (1978).
126. Interview with Judy Greenwood, supra note 119.
127. The Vecchione plaintiffs have filed interrogatories in anticipation of filing a motion
for contempt. Their allegations include: (1) no training in money management has oc-
curred for patients; (2) the guardian officers have not been permitted to raise objections to
hospital bills, thus resulting in no efforts at abatement; (3) guardian officers are not advising
the court of patients' discharges, resulting in non-institutionalized persons with institutional
guardians, or money being returned to Social Security or another agency and awaiting a new
appointment of a representative payee; and (4) the guardian officers and other institutional
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up to $2,500.00 during institutionalization but would retain all other
rights. Now with the court mandated right to "prior notice and
hearing," persons are stigmatized as incompetent and have a guard-
ian managing every aspect of their property and financial affairs
without their knowledge and without their consent.
28
Despite the serious repercussions of the Vecchione decision, one
should not lose sight of the reason for the original filing of the ac-
tion-to stop the seizure by the state of mental patients' assets in
order to pay hospital costs.' 29 The lawsuit's focus on due process
infractions was the obvious means to attack this onerous process.
The result, mandating prior notice, a hearing, and the appointment
of a guardian if a person were found incompetent, was hailed as a
victory for mental patients' rights.130  Yet, as we have seen, this
proclamation of victory was short sighted. Now the state can utilize
court sanctioned procedures to obtain the same result-payment of
hospital bills.
Some state statutes use the determination of incompetency to
limit the rights of mental patients.' 3' Other recent cases have also
used legal incompetency as a short sighted solution to redress seri-
ous deprivations of the rights of mentally disabled persons. In Rog-
ers v. Okin, 32 Rennie v. Klien, 33 and In re KKB., 3 4 the courts
addressed the pressing problem of the forced medication of mental
patients. These decisions have held that legally competent mental
patients may refuse medication except in emergencies, and guardi-
ans for legally incompetent patients may refuse or consent to treat-
ment. Thus, legally incompetent mental patients do not have the
officials have not made sufficient attempts to find representative payees prior to institution of
guardianship proceedings. Id
128. Vecchione v. Wohlgemuth, 80 F.R.D. 32 (E.D. Pa. 1978).
129. Vecchione v. Wohlgemuth, 377 F. Supp. 1361 (E.D. Pa. 1974), aff'd, 558 F.2d 150
(3d Cir.), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 943 (1977).
130. Vecchione v. Wohlgemuth, 80 F.R.D. 32, 36 (E.D. Pa. 1978).
131. E.g., DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 16 § 5161 (Supp. 1980) (no surgery or ECT without com-
petent patient's consent); IND. CODE § 16-14-1.6-4 (Supp. 1980); MONT. REV. CODE ANN.
§§ 38-1227 to -1228 (Supp. 1977) (right of competent patient to refuse electric shock); NEB.
REV. STAT. §§ 83-1066 to -1067 (1976) (guardian can force treatment on ward); NEV. REV.
STAT. § 433.484(1) (1979) (no treatment without consent of competent patient); N.C. GEN.
STAT. § 122.-55.6 (1981) (competent patient has right to refuse treatment); OHIO REV. CODE
ANN. § 5122.301 (Page 1981) (a person may exercise all civil rights despite hospitalization
unless adjudicated incompetent); S.D. CODIFIED LAWS ANN. § 27A-12-2(1) (rev. 1976)
(competent patient has right to refuse electric or insulin shock).
132. 478 F. Supp. 1342 (D. Mass. 1979), vacated and remanded, 634 F.2d 650 (1st Cir.
1980).
133. 462 F. Supp. 1131 (D.N.J. 1979).
134. 4 M.D.L.R. 72 (Okla. 1980).
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right to determine what substances will violate their bodily integrity.
Based on the Vecchione experience and the controversies surround-
ing the right of mental patients to refuse treatment, it is quite fore-
seeable that many more mental patients will be declared legally
incompetent in order for hospitals to exercise total control over
treatment. The only insurance against this occurrence is the pres-
ence of a constitutionally viable incompetency statute.
1 35
IV. CONCLUSION
The attempts at reform must go to the heart of the problem-
the nature of guardianship itself. Neither procedural cures nor
other piecemeal attempts at reform will suffice. Without a complete
revision, guardianship remains "a dangerous statute easily capable
of abuse ... to accomplish the very wrong to be guarded
against."' 136 In almost every case discussed in studies and case law
the incompetent was placed in a worse position after the adjudica-
tion of incompetency.1 37  Like Vecchione, other "reform" efforts
have only created additional problems.
38
There is no doubt that many mentally disabled persons require
assistance in money management or other personal affairs largely
because of lack of habilitation and the isolating results of institu-
135. For a discussion of this problem, see Plotkin, Limiting the Therapeutic Orgy." Mental
Patients Right to Refuse to Treatment, 72 Nw. U.L. REV. 461 (1977).
136. In re Bryden's Estate, 211 Pa. 633, 637, 61 A. 250, 251 (1905).
137. ALEXANDER & LEWIN, supra note 6, at 136.
138. Public guardianship systems have been used in several states, including California
and Minnesota. These systems have been disasterous, as they have proven to be both costly
and riveted with conflicts of interest. Indeed, their primary function appears to be commit-
ment rather than the provision of protective and counseling services. Hodgson, supra note 9;
Levy, supra note 50. The Report of the Task Force on Law of the President's Panel on
Mental Retardation (1963) advises that no person should be appointed as guardian who is
responsible for rendering a direct service to the person since incompetent persons require
outside guardians to check on services. To remedy the conflict of interest and the problem
of high bureaucratic costs, voluntary measures have been adopted by some consumer groups
and national organizations, including Massachusetts Association for Retarded Citizens
Retardate Trust, Inc., the British Paid Visitor Program, the British Columbia Lifetime
Friend Plan, but these measures have been unsuccessful because of lack of interest, inade-
quate funding, and insufficient legal authority. Hodgson, supra note 7. These proposals for
public guardians and voluntary measures are also antiquated since they were developed
primarily to protect institutionalized persons. But today, as discussed in this symposium, a
growing majority of mentally disabled persons are living in the community and the necessity
of lifelong assistance and protection by guardians or agencies clashes with this trend and the
embracement of normalization theory. Controller General Summary Report to the Con-
gress-Returning the Mentally Disabled to the Community, Government Needs to do More 1
(1977); President's Commission on Mental Health Report to the President at 43 (1978); Kin-
dred, supra note 2, at 65.
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tionalization.139 This necessary assistance can be provided in such a
way as to be least restrictive of the rights of the individual and to
maximize self-reliance and independence.
140
In 1962 the President's Panel on Mental Retardation proposed:
Mentally retarded adults be allowed freedom, even freedom to
make their own mistakes. We suggest the development of limited
guardianships of the adult person, with the scope of the guardi-
anship specified in the judicial order.
14 1
All subsequent studies and commissions have reiterated that call for
limited guardianship procedures. 42 Yet only seventeen states have
enacted laws permitting limited guardianship and/or conservator-
ship, and eleven of these have enacted separate provisions outlining
the power of limited guardians.143 Unfortunately, however, the co-
existence of both limited and plenary guardianship statutes has
caused the limited guardianship statutes to be rarely used. 44
The only effective approach, therefore, is the comprehensive
adoption of a limited guardianship concept as the sole legal proce-
dure for guardianship. The statutory aim must be the benefit of the
139. Welsch v. Likins, 373 F. Supp. 487 (D. Minn. 1974); New York State Ass'n for
Retarded Children, Inc. v. Rockefeller, 357 F. Supp. 752 (E.D.N.Y. 1973); Wyatt v.
Stickney, 334 F. Supp. 1341 (M.D. Ala. 1971), afl'd in part sub nom. Wyatt v. Aderholt, 503
F.2d 1305 (5th Cir. 1974); Herr, Civil Rights, Uncivil Asylums and the Retarded, 43 CIN. L.
REV. 679 (1974).
140. ABA Report to the House of Delegates by the Commission on the Mentally Dis-
abled on Guardianship (1979).
141. Presidential Panel on Mental Retardation, Report of the Task Force on Law 42
(1963).
142. E.g., President's Commission on Mental Health, Report to the President (1978); Re-
port of the Task Force on Law of the President's Panel on Mental Retardation (1975);
American Association on Mental Deficiency Position Paper on Guardianship for Mentally
Retarded Persons (1973).
143. ABA Study, supra note 3, at 4. Many states, such as Arkansas, have enacted conser-
vator statutes allowing persons to consent to the appointment of a conservator to manage
their funds. ARK. STAT. ANN. §§ 57-701 to -709 (Supp. 1981). The Arkansas conservator-
ship statute permits a person suffering from advanced age or physical disability to consent to
the appointment of a conservator to manage his or her estate. The conservator has the same
powers as the guardian of the estate. This statute, however, has been rarely used.
144. An ABA study found 10% of petitions in Washington resulted in limited guardian-
ships and no petitions filed in Milwaukee sought limited guardianships. Vargyas, Guardian-
shop, in LEGAL RIGHTS OF MENTALLY DISABLED PERSONS 339, 343-49 (1979). Similarly,
the North Carolina limited guardianship statute is seldom used. Conversation with H.
Rutherford Turnbull, III (Oct. 13, 1980). The Arkansas conservatorship law is also seldom
used. One can only speculate about the cause of the failure to use the limited guardianship
provisions. This may be caused by lack of knowledge on the part of counsel and court of the
limited provision, over-cautious courts trying to provide maximum protection to petitioners
and alleged incompetent persons, or merely reluctance of counsel to provide the increased
efforts necessary to fulfill the requisites of limited guardianship procedures.
SYMPOSIUM
alleged incompetent person and not the convenience of the bureau-
cracy or the protection of heirs.' 45 Unlike the Vecchione proposal,
which first evaluated the individual's competency, the first inquiry
must be whether an individual mentally disabled person requires
any assistance at all. If an individual has few assets and no medical
problems requiring hospitalization or treatment, protective assist-
ance may be wholly unnecessary. This is especially true for institu-
tionalized persons who rarely have assets and receive only small
sums of money.'46 These persons may require advocates to assist
them in insuring that they receive adequate treatment and habilita-
tion in the least restrictive settings, but certainly do not need persons
to act as their substitute decision-makers.' 47
If specific needs actually exist, then an exploration of alterna-
tives to resolve the problem should be undertaken by interested
family, friends, or governmental agencies. 148 Often, problems of
money management for a mentally disabled person involve only rel-
atively small sums composed of Social Security or Veterans Admin-
istration benefits. Both the VA and Social Security have systems
which permit the appointment of representative payees to manage
funds on the individual's behalf without any stigma of incompe-
tency. 149 Additionally, creative trust arrangements can be devel-
oped to handle larger sums of money. 150 Power of attorney
provisions or other common-law agency concepts can also resolve
almost any problem.' 1 As in civil commitment proceedings, a per-
son should not be deprived of fundamental rights if he could func-
tion effectively with the assistance of friends or relatives. 152 A friend
or relative can act as an agent to manage and invest funds or con-
sent to medical treatment while the mentally disabled person retains
145. Alexander and Szasz, From Contract to Status via Psychiatry, 13 SANTA CLARA
LAW. 537 (1973). See, e.g., MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. §§ 330.1600-.1642 (1980).
146. For example, SSI benefits for institutionalized mentally retarded persons are only
$25.00 per month.
147. As evidenced by Vecchione, the role of a guardian cannot be expected to be synony-
mous with that of an advocate. Of course, some family members and friends have so acted,
but this is quite rare. See, e.g., ALEXANDER & LEWIN, supra note 6; U.S. Senate Special
Committee on Aging, Protective Services for the Elderly-A Working Paper, 39-40 (July
1977); Kindred, supra note 2, at 69.
148. It has been the common practice of courts to deduce that because a person has a
disability, then the person requires assistance. This is the basis of our present disasterous
system of guardianship. See Mitchell, supra note 58.
149. 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1601-.1610 (1980); 38 C.F.R. §§ 13.1-.500 (1980).
150. ALEXANDER & LEWIN, supra note 6.
151. ARK. STAT. ANN. § 50-422 (1971).
152. O'Connor v. Donaldson, 422 U.S. 563, 577 (1975).
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the right to revoke the appointment at any time.1 53 These methods
would maximize the person's independence while providing the nec-
essary protection and assistance. Indeed, the agency concept is em-
bedded in the popular and growing program of citizen advocacy.
1 54
Only if no less restrictive alternative exists should court inter-
vention be considered. 55 In such rare instances, the petitioner must
demonstrate to the court's satisfaction that an exploration of least
restrictive alternatives has occurred and proved unsuccessful. Prior
to the court procedure, an independent multi-disciplinary evalua-
tion should be ordered by the court and paid for by the petitioner. 56
This multi-disciplinary evaluation should be performed by a team
of experts who will assess the person's present functional capabilities
and limitations and identify the specific areas where the person re-
quires the special assistance of a guardian.
157
A full court hearing must be held on the petition for appoint-
ment of a limited guardian and all due process protections of civil
commitment should apply. 158  The alleged incompetent person
should be provided with adequate prior notice which apprises him
or her of the nature of the hearing as well as his or her rights to
counsel, to present evidence, and to confront and cross-examine ad-
verse witnesses.'59 The hearing itself should provide a meaningful
opportunity for the alleged incompetent person to be heard. If
counsel is not present, counsel should be appointed for the alleged
incompetent person at the earliest possible date.160 A member of the
evaluation team should present the team's findings and recommen-
dations; he or she should be available for full and rigorous cross-
153. ALEXANDER & LEWIN, supra note 6. As an attorney representing mentally disabled
persons, I have seldom been faced with a money management problem that could not be
resolved by these methods.
154. Citizen advocacy is "advocacy in which a competent citizen volunteer represents-
as his very own-the interests of a person who is in some way impaired." Wolfsenberger,
Advocacy, in MENTALLY RETARDED CITIZENS AND THE LAW 619. See also CITIZEN ADVO-
CACY AND PROTECTIVE SERVICES FOR THE IMPAIRED AND HANDICAPPED (W. Wolf-
senberger & H. Zauha eds. 1973).
155. An example of a good blueprint for an equitable guardianship law is the Michigan
statute, MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. §§ 330.1600-.1642 (1980).
156. Id; ABA Study, supra note 3, at 93. Under the Michigan law the multi-disciplinary
team includes a psychologist; both the Michigan law and ABA proposals recognize that a
doctor is not necessarily qualified to perform evaluations on a mentally retarded or other
developmentally disabled person. Thus, the multi-disciplinary team approach helps elimi-
nate the specific limitations of any given discipline.
157. Id
158. ARK. STAT. ANN. §§ 59-1401 to -1428 (Cum. Supp. 1981).
159. Id
160. ABA Study, supra note 3, at 76, 95.
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examination. "' Additionally, the petitioner must demonstrate by
clear and convincing evidence that the alleged incompetent requires
the proposed protections. 62 A jury trial might also be provided if
requested by the alleged incompetent. ' 63 The court's inquiry should
focus on the specific area or areas in which the alleged incompetent
person requires assistance because his or her capacities are so lim-
ited that he or she is unable to manage his or her person or property
in the specifically designated areas. At the conclusion of the hear-
ing, the court will only have the power to declare the person par-
tially incompetent and to appoint a limited guardian. An order
should specify the areas in which the individual is functionally in-
competent and appoint a guardian to act in only the designated ar-
eas. 164 The guardianship order should be limited in time so that
periodic review is mandated.
165
Limited guardianship operating as a last resort only should,
properly, encompass very few mentally disabled persons. These
persons should receive only the minimum assistance necessary in
order to maximize independence and self-realization. Only under
such a system will mentally disabled persons be able to fully partici-
pate in American society as citizens with full civil rights.
161. Id
162. Addington v. Texas, 441 U.S. 418 (1979).
163. ABA Study, supra note 3, at 76.
164. Id at 96. The role of counsel should be more active. Under such a system, counsel
at the outset would be able to question whether an actual need for assistance exists, and
whether an exhaustion of less restrictive alternatives has actually occurred. Additionally,
counsel will be able to challenge the evaluators' determination and recommendations and
the specific areas designated by the petitioner or the evaluators as those in which the assist-
ance of a guardian is requested. Most importantly, the guardianship order will be open to
challenge to assure that it is the least restrictive alternative possible to maximize the individ-
ual's self-reliance and independence.
165. Ten states already require periodic review. ABA Study, supra note 3, at 5.
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